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Abstract
Under pressure from donor agencies such as the World Bank, a number of developing
countries have experimented with the privatisation of water services. This study reviews
the existing econometric evidence on the effects of water privatisation in developing
economies before presenting new results using statistical, data envelopment analysis
(DEA) and stochastic cost frontier techniques and data from Africa. The study fails to
find evidence of better performance in private utilities compared to state-owned utilities.
The paper then considers reasons why water privatisation could prove problematic in
lower-income economies, identifying the technology of water provision and nature of the
product, transaction costs and possible regulatory weaknesses.
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31. Introduction1
Access to water is crucial to life and health and the provision of safe and affordable
water services remains a priority for most developing economies. According to the World
Bank (2003, p.1) more than 1bn people in the developing world lack access to clean water
and nearly 1 .2bn lack adequate sanitation. It is estimated that 1 2.2m people die every
year from diseases directly related to drinking contaminated water. The inclusion of a
water access target in the Millenium Development Goals – to halve the proportion of people
without access to safe drinking water by 2015 – is a recognition of the importance of safe
water supply in reducing poverty in the developing world (Calderon and Serven, 2004).
One of the major causes of poor access to water services is the inefficiencies of the water
utilities which mainly serve the urban areas. The water utilities are predominantly in
public ownership, and in many systems as much as a third of production is lost, revenues are
insufficient to cover operating costs and the quality of the water is poor (World Bank,
2004a, p.220). Faced with the deterioration in water sector performance, donor agencies
have advocated the privatisation of public utilities in lower-income economies to promote
more efficient operation, increase investment and service coverage, and to reduce the
financial burden on government budgets (World Bank, 1995). In response, a range of
services including water supply have been opened up to private capital (World Bank,
2003; Harris, 2003). Private participation in water, however, has been less common than in
other infrastructure sectors, and the pace of reform has been slower and harder to
4sustain politically (World Bank, 2004: p220). Although privatisation appears to have the
potential to improve water services and meet the needs of the poor, it may be difficult to
achieve. The possible reasons relate to the technology of water provision (high fixed
costs and location specificity), which severely restrict the prospects for competition, the
transaction costs of organising long-term concession agreements and regulatory
weaknesses. There is also the difficulty of balancing adequate returns to investors and
ensuring that water services remain affordable to the poor.
The pressing challenge for public policy towards the water sector is to meet both
efficiency and social welfare objectives, and to determine the extent to which privatisation
is critical to achieving the Millenium Development Goal for safe, accessible and affordable
water services. This paper explores these issues by examining the impact of water services
privatisation in Africa. It begins with a review of the existing econometric evidence on the
impact of water privatisation. We then provide results using a data set for African water
utilities using statistical, DEA and stochastic cost frontier measures to triangulate the
evidence and to assess consistency across the results.2 Data availability restricted the
number of dimensions of performance that we were able to estimate, however, the results
for cost efficiency and service quality fail to show that performance of privatised water
utilities is superior to that of state-run firms. The paper goes on to consider the difficulties
that face privatisation and regulation in water services, in terms of the technology of water
provision and the nature of the product, transaction costs and regulatory weaknesses. That
data deficiency may explain our failure to identify better performance under private
operation is recognised.
52. The Existing Evidence
Private water suppliers exist in all developing countries in the form of water vendors at
the street level, but there was little privatisation of piped water services in developing
countries before 1990 (Snell, 1998; Collignon and Vézina, 2000). Where privatised
services existed, for example in Cote d’Ivoire, these were usually French speaking ex-
colonies that had inherited a reliance on private firms for water services, as exists in
France. Between 1984 and 1990 only eight contracts for water and sewerage projects
were awarded to the private sector world-wide and the cumulative new capital
expenditure in private water services totalled less than US$ 1bn.
However, during the 1990s there was a significant increase in water privatisation activity,
stimulated by donor agency pressures, and in 1997 the total figure for private investment
had risen to US$25bn (World Bank, 2003). By the end of 2000 at least 93 countries had
privatised some of their piped water services, including Argentina, Chile, China,
Colombia, the Philippines, South Africa and the transition economies of Central Europe,
as well as Australia and the UK (Brubaker, 2001). Based on the World Bank public-
private investment (PPI) data base and taking the period from 1990 to 2002, there were 106
such projects in Latin America and the Caribbean and 73 in East Asia and the Pacific
region. By contrast there were only seven projects in the Middle East and North Africa
and 14 in sub-Saharan Africa. In terms of the amounts invested, Latin America
6and the Caribbean and East Asia and the Pacific accounted together for over 95 per cent of
the total investment. Table 1 provides a summary of the largest investments in water
services during the period 1990 to 2002. Clearly, a small number of countries accounted
for most of the privatisation of water services, and within these countries the figures were
dominated by a few large contracts. Indeed, one project, Aguas Argentinas, accounted for
US$4.9bn or 20 per cent of the investment in the whole of Latin America; while five
Philippines contracts accounted for 38.4 per cent of the total private investment in water
services in East Asia.
(Table 1 here.)
Past studies of privatisation have indicated that competition is generally more important
than ownership, per se, in explaining performance improvements in developing countries
(e.g. Zhang et al., 2003; Parker and Kirkpatrick, 2005). But unlike in the case of
telecommunications and parts of energy supply, such as generation, where competition is
feasible, competition in the market for water services is usually cost inefficient. While
there is scope for introducing some competition into billing and metering and into
construction, replacement and repair work within water services, competition in the actual
provision of water supplies is normally ruled out by the scale of the investment in network
assets that are needed to deliver the product. Moreover, even where actual competition
for consumers might seem feasible, for example where the boundaries of different water
utilities meet, the costs of moving water down pipes is far higher than the costs of
transmitting telephone calls and distributing electricity, and this places a serious
7limitation on the development of competition. Also, mixing water from different sources
can raise complications in terms of maintaining water quality, which can be an important
consideration for domestic consumers but more especially water-using industries, such as
brewing and food processing. In other words, the technology of water supply and the
nature of the product, together, severely restrict the prospects for competition in the
market and therefore the efficiency gains that can result from encouraging competition
following privatisation. This leaves rivalry under privatisation mainly taking the form of
‘competition for the market’ or competition to win the contract or concession agreement.
Evidence suggests that privatisation in non-competitive markets produces ambiguous
results in terms of improving economic performance (Megginson and Netter, 2001) and
emphasises the need for effective regulation of the privatised utilities. It is to be expected,
however, that the institutional requirements to ensure that privatised monopolies perform
well, notably an effective system of state regulation and supporting governance structures,
will be particularly missing in many developing countries (Parker and Kirkpatrick, 2005).
This represents a further difficulty in achieving significant performance improvement in
the short term, by means of water privatisation.
Privatising water services is normally associated with contracts that take the following
forms, namely, service contracts (contracts to provide specialist services such as billing),
management contracts and leases for existing facilities (private companies operating
existing facilities but without new private sector investment), concessions (requiring the
private sector to invest in facilities), divestitures (sale by the state of some or all of the
8equity in SOEs) and greenfield investments (including build-operate-transfer [BOT] type
schemes) (Johnstone and Wood, 2001, pp.10-1 1; World Bank, 2004a, p228). In practice,
contracts under which private firms provide the services but government remains the
ultimate owner of the water system and may remain responsible for some investment are
commonplace (OECD, 2003). Of 233 water and sewerage contracts with the private sector
arranged between 1990 and 2002 on the World Bank’s PPI Project Database, 40 per cent
involved concession contracts and these accounted for 64 per cent of the total amount
invested. Where greenfield projects have occurred, for instance in China, they have often
involved the building and operation of new water treatment plants and BOT schemes for
water supplies have been common in Latin America and the Caribbean. Divestitures or the
sale of state-owned water businesses to the private sector have been rare, accounting for
only 15.6 per cent of all water projects and 8 per cent of the total funds invested. Also,
although privatisation of water services has occurred, it is important not to exaggerate its
importance. At present, little more than 5 per cent of the world’s population is provided
with drinking water through private operators (OECD, 2003) and since the Asian
economic crisis of 1997/98 there has been a marked slow down in infrastructure
privatisation in lower-income economies, including in the water sector (Harris, 2003).
Moreover, the main forms that water privatisation take raise issues about the transfer of
risk from the public to the private sector. We return to this subject later in the paper in a
discussion of transaction costs in water service contracting.
The existing case study evidence on the results of water privatisation presents a mixed
picture, with some improvements in labour productivity and operating costs and in the
9reliability and quality of services and the percentage of the population served (e.g.
Crampes and Estache, 1996; Estache, et al., 2001; Galiani et al., 2002; Shirley and
Menard, 2002; World Bank, 2004a, pp.252-257). Balanced against this there is some
evidence of higher water charges and resulting bouts of public opposition leading to
cancelled schemes. The evidence is reviewed in Kirkpatrick and Parker (2005), also
Shirley (ed) 2002. Turning to the few published papers that have attempted a statistical or
econometric analysis of the effects of water privatisation in lower-income economies,
these too present little evidence that privatisation has resulted in a marked improvement in
performance. Estache and Rossi (2002) compared private and public water companies in
the Asian and Pacific region, using 1995 survey data from the Asia Development Bank.
Adopting stochastic cost frontier modelling and applying error components and technical
efficiency effects models, they concluded that efficiency was not significantly different in
the private and state water sectors. Fifty water enterprises were included in their study
from 29 Asian and Pacific-region countries, with 22 having some form of private sector
participation.
A further study, this time by Estache and Kouassi (2002), used a sample of 21 African
water utilities for the period 1995/97. They estimated a production function from an
unbalanced panel data set and used Tobit modelling to relate resulting inefficiency scores to
governance and ownership variables. The study found that private ownership was
associated with a lower inefficiency score. However, only three firms in their sample had
any private capital and levels of corruption and governance were far more important in
explaining efficiency differences between firms than the ownership variable.
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Finally, a study of water supply in Africa in the mid to late 1990s by Clarke and Wallsten
(2002) reported greater service coverage under private ownership. On average, they found
that supplies for lower-income households (proxied by educational attainment) were
smaller where there was a state-sector operator. Clarke and Wallsten, therefore, concluded
that private participation in water schemes leads to more supplies to poorer households
than where there is a reliance on state-owned suppliers. Their study suggests that
privatisation can improve service provision. However, there may be offsetting service
difficulties and especially higher charges when supplies are privatised. In other words,
drawing strong conclusions on the desirability of water privatisation based on one measure,
such as service coverage, may mislead. In the analysis below we use a range of performance
measures in an attempt to address this problem.
3. Assessing Performance in Privatised African Water Utilities
To advance understanding of the results of privatisation in water services, we accessed
data from the Water Utility Partnership’s SPBNET Africa web site
(http://www.wupafrica.org/spbnet/angl/index.html). The SPBNET data base includes up to
110 water utilities in Africa and was developed with financial and technical support from
the Department of International Development (DFID) in London. The data collected,
usually by questionnaire survey, relate mainly to the year 2000.3 The data set used for
this study has 13 countries including 14 utilities that reported private sector
involvement.4 However, not all of these firms could be included in each stage of the
11
analysis because of incomplete data entries. Suppliers are categorised as either state
owned or privately owned, with the latter capturing the various institutional options for
private sector involvement in the water sector, including management and leasing
contracts. Ideally we would use information on the forms that private-sector involvement
takes to judge the degree of privatisation, but unfortunately the data source only permitted
ownership to be modelled as a binary variable. This is a limitation of our study, but a
limitation shared with the earlier econometric studies referred to above. More generally, the
data set is characterised by heterogeneity, small sample size and small number of
privatised firms. The data limitations mean that the results must be treated as tentative.
Conclusions on the impact of water privatisation may be sensitive to the precise
performance measure used. Therefore, to assess the impact of private capital on
performance in water services, a range of performance measures was calculated. Firstly, a
number of statistical measures were computed from the data set, including:
• Labour productivity – labour costs to total costs, number of staff to number of water
connections and staff per million cubic metres of water distributed – all of these
measures will reflect eficiency in the use of labour.
 The proportion of operating costs spent on fuel and chemicals – to reflect
economies in non-labour operating costs.
 The percentage of capital utilised – to reflect capital stock eficiency.
 Average tariffs – to reflect the costs of services to consumers.
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• The percentage of the population served, unaccounted for water (water losses), and
hours of availability of piped water per day – to reflect the quality of service
to consumers.
Average figures were computed for both state-owned and privately-owned water
suppliers and the results are provided in Table 2, with standard deviations shown in
parentheses. This stage of the analysis involved between 61 and 84 utilities depending
upon the performance measure.
(Table 2 here.)
The figures in Table 2 show that, on average, private sector water utilities have higher
labour productivity (both a lower number of staff to number of connections and per
million cubic metres of water distributed) and a lower proportional spend on labour in
operating costs than state-owned firms. On average, the private sector is also more
economic in its use of other inputs, namely fuel and chemicals, and achieves a slightly
higher capital utilisation, of 67 per cent as against 60 per cent. Hence, the private sector
seems superior in terms of production efficiency. Turning to tariffs, charges are on
average 82 per cent higher in the private sector and more customers have their water
consumption metered where services are privatised.5 Metering water can be a means of
extracting higher revenues from consumers by linking payments to the volumes of water
used. The private sector also achieves a lower percentage of water losses, averaging 29
per cent as against 34.8 per cent for state-owned water firms (probably assisted by more
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metering). But, interestingly, other measures of customer service suggest smaller
differences between the private and state sectors. On average, state-owned firms supply
piped water for 17 hours per day, while the private sector records a slightly lower figure of
16 hours. The state and private sectors serve about the same percentage of population in
their areas, 63 per cent and 64 per cent respectively.
The standard deviation figures in parentheses in Table 2 confirm a high degree of variance
in performance within both the state and private sector categories for each of the measures.
These results suggest that conclusions based on average performance need to be
interpreted with care. This is confirmed by the F-test results (shown in the final column of
Table 2) for the difference in means for the public and private utilities’ performance
ratios, none of which are statistically significant. Also, calculations using the SPBNET
data base suggest that in Africa privately-owned water utilities are on average over twice
as large as state-owned ones in terms of the total volume of water distributed (92m as
against 36.4m cu.mts. per day) and have more connections to their systems (averaging
159,600 in the case of the private utilities, as against 94,500 in the case of the state-owned
firms). This may partially account for the private utilities’ somewhat better performance
in terms of labour productivity.
Therefore, to provide a fuller appraisal of relative performance two further sets of
performance measures were calculated, drawing on the same data base, using stochastic
frontier analysis (SFA) and data envelopment analysis (DEA).
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The Cost Function Analysis
A cost function was estimated on the basis of the SBPNET database. The reason for
choosing a cost frontier instead of a production frontier lies in the fact that most water
utility firms are required to meet demand and are not free to choose the level of output.
With output set exogenously, the firm is expected to minimise the costs of producing a
given level of output. The coefficients of the cost function can be estimated by OLS
regression analysis. Alternatively, a stochastic cost frontier model estimated by the
Maximum Likelihood (ML) method can be used. Compared to the OLS model, the
stochastic cost frontier model decomposes the error term into stochastic noise (νi ) and
cost inefficiency (μi ).
Various distributions have been suggested for the inefficiency term in the stochastic cost
function. Two of the most commonly used are the half-normal distribution (Aigner,
Lovell and Schmidt, 1977) and truncated-normal distribution (Stevenson,1980). The
truncated-normal distribution is a generalisation of the half-normal distribution, obtained
by the truncation at zero of the normal distribution, with mean, µ, and variance, 2
óì . Pre-
assigning µ to be zero reduces the truncated distribution to half-normal. The appropriate
model for estimation can be determined by testing the null hypothesis H0: µ=0. If the
hypothesis µ=0 is rejected, this means that the assumption of the truncated distribution is
correct. If µ is not significantly different from zero, a model assuming a half-normal
distribution should be estimated instead.
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Following the parameterisation proposed in Battese and Correa (1977), 2óì and 2
óv are
replaced with 2
ó = 2 óì + 2
óv , γ= 2 óì /( 2 óì + 2
óv ). This is done to allow the application
of maximum likelihood estimates. The parameter γ lies between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating
that the deviation from the frontier is due entirely to noise and 1 indicating that deviation is
due purely to inefficiency. The superiority of a stochastic frontier can be
tested by the null hypothesis, H0: γ =0. If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, this
indicates that the inefficiency term should be removed from the model, leaving a
specification with parameters that can be consistently estimated using OLS.
The stochastic cost function has been widely specified as a Cobb-Douglas function or as a
translog cost function. A generalised likelihood–ratio test was used to test whether a
Cobb-Douglas function was appropriate. The result showed that the null hypothesis of the
Cobb-Douglas specification cannot be rejected. In addition, Leamer’s extreme bound
analysis was conducted and it showed that the range of the coefficients of the key
variables for the Cobb-Douglas function was much smaller than that of the translog
model.6 This confirms that the employment of the Cobb-Douglas specification is
appropriate. In order to account for variable return to scale, the quadratic term of the
output variable was included, however, the coefficient was statistically insignificant.7 A
likelihood ratio test was conducted and the results also pointed to the standard Cobb-
Douglas specification.
Following the literature, we estimated the cost function using data on the cost level, the
output level and input prices. Data availability required us to use operating and
maintenance costs (COST) or non-capital coats, as the dependent variable in the cost
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frontier. An arbitrary cost function was therefore formulated which excluded the price of
the capital input.8 Average manpower cost per employee ( M P ) was used to reflect the cost
of labour, and material costs per unit of water distributed (MAT) were included as an
additional determinant of non-capital costs. The amount of water distributed per year
( W D ) was included in the cost function as the output variable. Also included in the
function was a quality variable, measured by the hours of piped water available per day
( Q U A L I ) . 9
A number of control or environmental variables were also included to capture cross
country heterogeneity in the political, legal and economic environment.10 Good
governance in the form of sound finance and regulatory systems and protection of property
rights has been found to be an important explanation of economic performance differences
(North, 1990; Jalilian et al., 2002; Kaufman et al., 2002), including in water services
(Estache and Kouassi, 2002). The freedom variable (FRD) developed by the Fraser
Institute (http://www.freetheworld) was therefore included to capture wider governance or
regulatory effects on performance in water utilities, which might otherwise have been
attributed to ownership. An index of property rights (PROPERTY) was used as a measure of
the quality of the investment environment. The fiscal balance variable (BALANCE)
proxies the quality of macro economic management in the form of budgetary policy. A
density variable, measured by population served per connection ( D E N ) , was included
because it plays an important role in defining the network infrastructure.11 Another
variable used as a control was the annual water resources per capita ( W R S ) . GDP per
capita ( G D P ) was included in an attempt to capture the extent of
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economic development. Finally, to account for the effects of ownership on performance, a
dummy variable ( O N S ) was included in the model, which took the value of 1 if the
utility had private capital, as defined earlier.
All variables except the ownership variable and those in index or percentage terms were
logged. In total 76 observations were included in the estimations, including ten private
sector operations. The programme FRONTIER 4.1 was used to obtain the maximum
likelihood estimates of the parameters and the efficiency measures. The procedure for
estimation was as follows. An Error-Component (EC) model was first estimated with the
assumption of a half-normal distribution for the inefficiency term. 12 In order to test the
robustness of the results on ownership, a Technical Efficiency Effects (TEE) frontier was
then estimated in which the inefficiency effects were expressed as a function of the
ownership dummy.13
The first three columns of Table 3 show the results for the EC model. The OLS estimates
are also shown in the table for comparative purposes. The value of γ in the EC model
suggests a high (0.98) ratio of the variance of inefficiency to the total residual variance.14
Analogously, the high value of γ means that the stochastic frontier is superior to OLS
modelling in explaining the cost structure of the water utilities. This is also confirmed by
the generalised likelihood –ratio (LR) statistic, which exceeds the critical value at the 1
per cent level.15 We therefore concentrate on the Maximum Likelihood (ML) results in
Table 3.
18
(Table 3 here)
From the results of the half-normal EC model, it can be seen that the output variable,
ln(WD), has a positive and significant effect on operating costs. This is in line with normal
expectation. Similarly, the variables of service quality (ln(QUALI)), labour price (ln(MP))
and material cost (ln(MAT)) are all significant and correctly signed. The negative and
statistically significant (at the 10 per cent level) coefficient for the water resources variable
(lnWRS) is also consistent with our expectations. We would expect that the costs of water
production and distribution tend to be lower in countries where water resources are
abundant. The negative coefficients of income per capita (ln(GDP)) and the freedom index
(FRD) suggest that the operational costs of the utilities may be lower in countries which
are wealthier and sounder in terms of general institutional governance. However, the effects
are not statistically significant. More robust evidence of the influence of institutional
development is provided by the property rights variable (PROPERTY) which shows
negative and significant effects on the cost level. This indicates that costs are lower in
countries where property rights and therefore private investment are better protected. The
impact of the government fiscal management measure (BALANCE) appears to be trivial.
Contrary to our expectation, however, the results for the density variable (DEN) are
statistically insignificant. Turning to the role of ownership, which is our main concern, the
coefficient of the ownership dummy (ONS) is positive, suggesting that private ownership is
associated with higher costs. However, the result is not statistically significant.
19
In order to determine the robustness of this result, we estimated a TEE model in which the
inefficiency term was expressed as a function of the ownership dummy. In the TEE
model the inefficiency error ìi has a mean of mi and mi = ä x i . xi , which is a vector of
variables that may influence the efficiency of a firm. This was taken as the ownership
dummy in our estimation. The results of the ML estimation (Table 3, final column) show
that the coefficient δ(ONS) is positive but not statistically significant. This finding is
consistent with the outcome from the EC model for ownership.
The Data Envelopment (DEA) Analysis16
A DEA analysis was also undertaken in which water distributed was represented by the
volume of output produced and hours of piped water available per day was used as the
proxy for the quality of water services (unaccounted for water and the percentage of
samples that failed to meet the quality standards were also used as the quality of service
proxy and the results were very similar). An input-oriented, variable returns to scale model
was adopted to allow for the variation in size of the utilities.17 The number of utilities
entered into the analysis was 66 of which nine were private. The inputs used were manpower
cost per employee (because number of staff would not reflect the average skill level of
staff18), material cost per unit of water distributed and the number of water treatment
works. Using a Tobit model, the efficiency scores from the initial DEA analysis were
regressed on the control variables, namely, DEN, WRS, GDP, FRD, PROPERTY, AND
BALANCE (as defined earlier). The results of the Tobit analysis showed that only DEN
and PROPERTY were statistically significant, and these two variables were included as
control variables in a second stage DEA analysis.19
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Table 4 summarises the final DEA results according to the number of utilities that
achieved a score of 100 per cent efficiency, 90 per cent to 99 per cent efficiency and 80
per cent to 89 per cent efficiency under private and state operation.20 Significantly, state-
owned firms help to form the efficiency frontier, suggesting that state ownership does not
necessarily lead to low relative efficiency. The number of state-owned firms on the
frontier amounted to 32 out of the 57 firms or 53 per cent of the total of state-owned firms
in the data set. Six of the nine private operations included in the analysis populated the
frontier. The DEA results appear to be consistent, therefore, with the SFA analysis, in
suggesting that the efficiency performance of state-owned water firms in Africa can be
comparable to that of private enterprises. However, the results provide stronger evidence for
possible higher relative efficiency in the private sector as a whole, although it should be
born in mind that there are only nine private firms in the sample. For example, no utilities
with private sector involvement have less than 70 per cent relative efficiency and 67 per
cent of private as against 53 per cent of state operations populate the frontier.
(Table 4 here.)
4. Transaction Costs and Water Concessions
Before concluding the paper, it is interesting to consider why privatisation of water
services may be problematic in lower-income economies. The answer seems to lie in a
combination of the technology of water provision and the nature of the product, the costs
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of organising long-term concession agreements or transaction costs, and regulatory
weaknesses, to which we now turn.
As already explained, the technology of water supply and the nature of the product,
together, severely restrict the prospects for competition in the market and therefore the
efficiency gains that can result from encouraging competition following privatisation. This
leaves rivalry under privatisation mainly in the form of ‘competition for the market’ or
competition to win the contract or concession agreement. However, here serious problems
can arise. These problems relate to the existence of pervasive transaction costs. Transaction
costs arise in contracting for water services provision, in terms of the costs of arranging the
agreements, including organising the bidding process, monitoring contract performance,
and enforcing the contract terms where failures are suspected (Williamson, 1985). The
economics literature suggests that such costs are likely to be high where there are serious
information asymmetries at the time of the contract agreement. These information
imperfections are likely to be especially prevalent when contracts have to be negotiated to
cover service provision over long periods of time because many future events that could
affect the economic viability of the contract and the acceptability of the service offering are
unforeseen, and may be unforeseeable. Concession agreements in water are typically
negotiated for 10 or 20 years or more. Inevitably, therefore, the contracts will need to
permit periodic adjustment of variables such as price, volume and quality during the
contract life. The contract will be incomplete in terms of specifying all of the contingencies
that may trigger such adjustments and the form the renegotiation might take. This places a
large emphasis on the skills of both government and companies
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when operating water concessions, to ensure as far as possible that the outcome is
mutually beneficial.
The usual approach in water concessions is to have a two-part bidding process. The first
stage involves the initial selection of approved bidders, based on technical capacity, and
then a final stage in which the winner is selected, based on criteria such as the price
offered and service targets. However, the smaller the number of bidders the greater the
scope for actual or tacit collusion when bidding and the less effective will be the
competitiveness of the bidding process. The evidence suggests that water concessions in
developing countries are subject to small numbers bidding (McIntosh, 2003, p.2). For
example, in 2001 18 companies expressed interest in operating a contract for Nepal in the
first stage of the process, but in the final stage only two serious bidders remained (cited in
Mitlin, 2002, p.1 7). In Argentina there have usually been only a small handful of
applicants for water concessions, typically between two and four (Estache, 2002). In an
attempt to stimulate interest from more potential suppliers, concessions can include
sovereign (government or donor agency) guarantees of profitability, but this introduces
obvious moral hazard risks – with profits guaranteed, what incentive exists for the
concession winner to operate efficiently?
The literature on transaction costs also suggests that small numbers contracting is a source
of opportunistic behaviour (Williamson, 1985). The result can be both adverse selection
and moral hazard. Adverse selection takes the form of sub-optimal contracts at the outset,
resulting from one of the contracting parties acting opportunistically to arrange
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especially favourable terms; while moral hazard occurs when one of the contracting
parties renegotiates the terms of the contract in their favour during its lifetime. During
contract renegotiation either the company or the government could be the loser,
depending upon the results of the renegotiation.21
Guasch (2004) concludes that 75 per cent of water and sanitation concession contracts in
Latin America and the Caribbean were renegotiated significantly within a few years of
being signed – in Buenos Aires prices were raised within months of the start of the water
concession (Alcazar et al., 2000). But even the ability to renegotiate terms may not be
sufficient to overcome investor reluctance to participate in water privatisations, thus
reinforcing the small numbers bargaining problem. Difficulties arise especially when
private investors fear that there is no long term political commitment to water
privatisation (Rivera, 1996). Moreover, corrupt payments to win concessions and
‘cronyism’ may compromise the legitimacy of the privatisation process; for example, in
Lesotho the Highlands Water Project was associated with bribes to government officials
(Bayliss, 2000, p.14). Esguerra (2002) shows how the water concessions in Manila were
backed by the Philippines’ two wealthiest families with support from multinationals: ‘It
appears that the two companies’ approach was to win the bid at all costs, and then deal
with the problems of profitability later’ (ibid., p.2).
Studying concession contracts in developing countries, Harris et al. (2003) find that water
and sewerage concessions have the second highest incidence of post-contract cancellation
after toll roads. Given the existence of substantial potential ‘sunk costs’ in the water
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industry, this is not surprising. Tamayo et al. (1999, p.91) note that the specificity of
assets in the water industry is three to four times that in telecommunications and
electricity. Handley (1997) stresses the problems caused by inadequate risk management
techniques in developing countries; while the preference on the part of the private sector for
the state to remain responsible for the infrastructure in water contracting reflects the
desire of companies to minimise their sunk costs. Transaction costs in water concessions
reinforce serious weaknesses in government regulatory capacity in developing countries
(Spiller and Savedoff, 1999, pp.1-2). For example, in India there have been some local
moves to attract private capital into water supply, notably in Tiruppur, Maharashtra and
Gujarat. But regulatory systems are underdeveloped and in Tiuppur they appear to be
largely under the indirect control of the water operator (Teri, 2003, pp.1 71-21). As Mitlin
(2002, pp.54-55) concludes on the experience in Manila:
The experience in Manila suggests that the gains [from privatisation] may be less
than anticipated because the assumption that the involvement of the private sector
would remove political interference from the water sector was wrong. It may be
that processes and outcomes have simply become more complex because the water
supply industry now has the interests of private capital in addition to a remaining
level of politicisation and an acute level of need amongst the poorest citizens.
To assess the effects of regulation on water privatisation in Africa we repeated our
stochastic cost function analysis, but this time incorporating a regulatory variable as a
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dummy alongside the existing freedom variable (representing wider good governance in a
country). The SPBNET data base provides information on the existence of regulation of
prices, water quality and customer services. The different regulatory indicators were
included separately in the regressions. We also combined the three measures into a
composite regulation dummy to reflect the existence or lack of existence of regulation in
water. Our expectation was that regulation would impact on costs depending upon the
form regulation takes. For example, a good regulatory regime should create more investor
certainty and may reduce the costs of capital. Alternatively, regulation could raise costs by
imposing higher and more expensive quality standards or by raising uncertainty for
investors. The results from this regression analysis showed that the composite regulation
dummy and the water quality and services dummies each had a negative sign, suggesting
that the existence of regulation lowered operating costs. However, these results were not
statistically significant. The regulation dummy for tariff regulation was positively signed
and statistically significant, suggesting that regulation of prices increased costs.
The findings from this stage of the analysis were, therefore, inconclusive.22 Regulation,
both sector specific and as reflected in the general standards of governance in a country,
proved to be statistically insignificant. The single exception related to tariff regulation
and this result is consistent with recent concerns that state regulation can raise costs
(World Bank, 2004b). However, the regulation variables used are far from ideal and
future research would benefit from developing a set of superior regulatory variables that
more closely reflect the form of regulation rather than simply its existence.
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5. Conclusions
This paper has reviewed the existing econometric evidence on the impact of water
privatisation in developing countries and has reported the results of a new analysis for
Africa, using a range of performance measures and data for 2000. The study has reported
statistical indicators of performance and both DEA and stochastic cost frontier results. In
principle, privatisation has the potential to improve water services in developing
countries, reversing decades of underinvestment and low productivity under state supply.
However, the results, taken together, do not provide strong evidence of differences in the
performance of state-owned water utilities and water utilities involving some private
capital in Africa. While the DEA results point tentatively to private sector superiority, the
SFA provides some but statistically insignificant evidence that state-owned utilities have the
better cost performance. The descriptive statistics suggest no statistically significant
differences.
Our results therefore complement those of Estache and Rossi (2002), who also failed to
find evidence of superior performance on the part of privately-owned water utilities in
developing countries. Estache and Kouassi (2002) reported a statistically significant result
for the effect of privatisation. However, this was based on data for three privatised utilities
in a total sample of 21 water utilities in Africa, and governance and institutional factors
were found to be much more significant in explaining performance. Admittedly our results
contrast with the findings of Crampes and Estache, 1996, and Galiani et al., 2002, who
concentrated upon service coverage. They concluded that privatisation led to
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benefits in terms of numbers provided with safe water and sanitation. We found no real
difference in the percentage of the population served, but due to limited availability of
data we were unable to explore this dimension of service in detail. We acknowledge that
our findings like those of the earlier studies are dependent upon the data inputted and this
was far from ideal. There is also the possibility that governments in Africa turned to
private capital for the worst performing water utilities, thus making it less likely that we
would find evidence of superior private sector performance.
The paper then considered some reasons why water privatisation might prove problematic
in lower-income economies, identifying potential difficulties stemming from water supply
technology and the nature of the product, transaction costs and regulatory capacity. These
difficulties may help explain why private ownership does not have an unequivocally
positive effect on performance in water supply in our and some earlier studies. By
including regulation dummies in the stochastic cost frontier model, we attempted to shed
further light on the importance of regulation, but the results were mainly statistically
insignificant. This outcome may reflect the crudity of the regulatory variables used, which
simply measure the existence of water regulation not its impact on the management of
utilities. Under conditions of perfect competition, perfect information and complete
contracts ownership does not matter (Shapiro and Willig, 1990) and the regulatory
environment becomes trivial. However, none of these conditions applies to water services
and it is to be expected that governance and regulatory variables will be important in
determining performance pre and post-privatisation.
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Finally, it needs to be stressed that the provision of affordable, safe and accessible water to
the poor is a fundamental priority for low income countries. Policy makers and regulators
are likely to face difficult trade-offs between allowing firms to charge prices high enough
to recover costs and ensuring that poor households are provided with affordable water
supplies, while at the same time attracting the necessary foreign capital and technical
capabilities to upgrade and expand the water supply network. We found that private
operation of water facilities is associated with much higher average water charges. Also,
we found that private involvement tended to lead to more water metering - but what is the
impact of this on water consumption and health? Water privatisation usually means the
involvement of a handful of major international companies - but what effect does this
have in terms of developing indigenous ownership and regulation of socially important
assets?23 Also, if privatisation leads to full cost recovery in water, is this outcome
compatible with poverty reduction; and what are the environmental implications of
privatisation? Clearly, water privatisation raises a complex set of political economy
questions that deserve fuller exploration than has been possible here because of data
limitations.
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Appendix 1 Descriptive Statistics
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Availability of piped
water (hours per day) 2 24 17.17 6.989
Labour cost per
employee (in PPP 134.49 88478.92 12806.64 17851.00
units)
Material cost per unit
water distributed (in 0.00024 0.67 0.17 0.15
PPP units)
Number of
connections (in 0.01 526.14 61.78 100.34
thousand)
Total operating cost
(in PPP units) 62812.45 1107688842.80 53038864.01 157294171.22
total volume of water
distributed per year 8200 668000000 48258663.55 95605864.54
(cum)
Table 1: Largest Investments in Water Services in Developing Countries, 1990-2002
US$bn No. of projects
Argentina 7.23 10
Philipines 5.87 5
Chile 3.95 13
Brazil 3.17 33
Malaysia 2.75 6
China 1.93 44
Romania 1.04 3
Turkey 0.94 2
Indonesia 0.92 8
Source: calculated using data from the World Bank PPI Project Database,
http://rru.worldbank.org/PPI
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Table 2: Performance Ratios in African Water Utilities: 2000
Performance Indicator Average for State-
sector operations
(standard deviations
in parentheses)
Average for
private-sector
operations (standard
deviations in
parentheses)
F- test for between-
groups difference in
means (probability
statistics in parentheses)
Labour Productivity
Labour costs in total costs
( per cent)
Staff per thousand water
connections
Staff per million 3
mof
water distributed
29 per cent (17)
20.1 (19.9)
123 (519.7)
21 per cent (27)
13.1 (14.4)
78 (151.8)
1.45 (0.23)
0.22 (0.65)
0.18 (0.68)
Operating costs
Proportion spent on fuel
Proportion spent on
chemicals
20 per cent (16)
17 per cent (16)
11 per cent (12)
4 per cent (5)
0.44 (0.51)
2.37 (0.13)
Capital
Capital utilisation 60 per cent (21.6) 67 per cent (21.8) 0.076 (0.79)
Consumer charges
Average tariff (US$ per
3
m)
per cent of customers
metered
168 (473)
60 (41.5)
305 (440)
79 (38.4)
1.9 (0.17)
1.45 (0.23)
Quality of service
Percentage of population
served
Unaccounted for water
Availability of piped water
(hours per day)
63 (29.8)
34.8 per cent (13.5)
17 (6.7)
64 (30.2)
29.0 per cent (13.1)
16 (9.3)
0.22 (0.64)
0.63 (0.43)
0.25 (0.62)
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Table 3: The Stochastic Cost Frontier Results
EC model (half normal distribution) TEE model
Variable OLS ML Variable OLS ML
constant 4.17 1.18 constant 4.05 1.55
(2.60)*** (1 .65)* (2.47)** (0.29)
Ln(WD) 0.76 0.88 Ln(WD) 0.76 0.86
(13.22)*** (29.49)*** (13.02)*** (23.97)***
Ln(QUALI) 0.12 0.14 Ln(QUALI) 0.06 0.11
(0.81) (1.88)** (0.38) (1.80)**
Ln(MP) 0.26 0.15 Ln(MP) 0.25 0.17
(3.76)*** (4.33)*** (3.62)*** (5.28)***
Ln(MAT) 0.56 0.65 Ln(MAT) 0.56 0.63
(8.20)*** (15.84)*** (7.99)*** (8.25)***
Ln(WRS) -0.001 -0.09 Ln(WRS) 0.0009 -0.08
(0.01) (1.48)* (0.01) (0.22)
Ln(DEN) -0.02 0.00003 Ln(DEN) -0.028 -0.02
(0.44) (0.001) (0.65) (0.10)
Ln(GDP) 0.09(0.85) -0.01 Ln(GDP) 0.15 -0.03
(0.26) (1.40)* (0.31)
FRD -0.13 -0.08 FRD -0.12 -0.02
(1.28) (0.22) (1.18) (0.54)
PROPERTY -0.11 -0.05 PROPERTY -0.13 -0.06
(1 .38)* (4.03)*** (1 .59)* (1 .83)**
BALANCE 0.02 -0.004 BALANCE 0.02 0.004
(0.64) (0.32) (0.53) (0.09)
ONS 0.42 0.15 δ (ONS) 0.11
(2.00)** (1.05) (0.15)
ã 0.98 ã 0.98
(0.63E+07) (0.21E+06)
LR test 34.63 LR test 44.53
Total 76 76 Total 76 76
Observations Observations
*** significant at 1 per cent level
** significant at 5 per cent level *
significant at 10 per cent level
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Table 4: Summary of the DEA Results
Utilities with
100 per cent
relative
efficiency
Number Percent
Utilities with
efficiency of
90 per cent to
99 per cent
Number Percent
Utilities with
efficiency of
80 per cent to
89 per cent
Number Percent
Utilities with
efficiency of
70 per cent to
79 per cent
Number Percent
Utilities with
efficiency
under 70 per
cent Number
Percent
State 32 53 7 12 9 16 5 9 4 5
Private 6 67 1 11 1 11 1 11 0 0
The lowest score, 52.5, was recorded by a state-owned water utility in South Africa.
1 We would like to thank three referees and the editor for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
2 As Bauer et al. (1998) emphasise, we can have more confidence in comparative analysis if different
measurements produce reasonably consistent conclusions.
3 Data for a few utilities relate to the years 1999 or 2001. Given the closeness of the years, we treat all of
the data as applying to one year, 2000, to adopt a cross-sectional analysis of performance. The descriptive
statistics for the sample are given in appendix 1.
4 Concession and management and lease contracts, together with privately owned assets, are categorised as
private utilities. The utilities classified as private were cross-checked with the World Bank’s PPI database.
The countries in our database with private water utilities are Cape Verde, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon,
Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Morocco, Republic of Guinea, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia and Zambia.
5 Admittedly, tariff figures have to be viewed with care as tariff levels are affected by public policy towards
subsidies.
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6 We applied the Leamer’s Extreme Bound Analysis to the Cobb-Douglas and the translog specifications.
Accordingly, the output and input variables were treated as ‘focus’ variables and control variables as
‘doubtful’ variables. The bounds yielded from the Cobb-Douglas model were much narrower than those
from the translog model. In addition, in the translog model the bound for the material input variable
spanned zero. The results suggested that coefficients for the Cobb-Douglas model were more robust than
those for the translog specification.
7 The full results for these tests are available from the authors.
8 A similar procedure is followed in Estache and Rossi (2002). In response to a referee’s comment that the
exclusion of a fixed capital measure may result in a misspecification of the cost function, we tested an
alternative specification of the cost function where the number of water treatment plants was included as a
proxy variable for capital costs. The results for the ownership variable were unaffected.
9 Alternative quality indicators, namely unaccounted for water and the percentage of samples that fail to
meet quality standards were also tested, with similar results.
10 See Rodrik et al (2004) and Glaeser et al (2004) for a discussion of the use of institutional quality
variables in quantitative analysis.
11 We are grateful to a referee for pointing out that this density measure does not fully capture the
dispersion of connections since it does not allow for the number of connections per building.
Unfortunately, data on the more common measures of dispersion, such as connections per km of main or
connections per square km, were not available.
12 The Error Component model is the standard form of stochastic frontier model used in the literature. It
decomposes the error term into stochastic noise and cost inefficiency. The results of the EC model with the
truncated-distribution assumption showed that u was 0.47 with a standard error of 2.56. A likelihood ratio test
was performed and the results showed that the hypothesis u=0 could not be rejected at the 10 per cent level.
Consequently, the results from the model with the half-normal assumption were adopted.
13 The Technical Efficiency Effect model can be used to investigate the determinants of technical
inefficiencies among firms. Compared to the Error Component model, the Technical Efficiency Effects
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Frontier is a stochastic frontier model that explicitly formulates technical inefficiency effects in terms of
firm-specific factors. All parameters were estimated in a single-stage Maximum Likelihood procedure.
14 A referee has pointed out that the error term may be capturing more than just inefficiency where there is
misspecification because of heterogeneity and/or measurement problems. We accept this reservation.
15 The critical value was obtained from Kodde and Palm (1986).
16 We are grateful to Catarina Figueira for assistance with the DEA analysis.
17 A constant returns to scale model produced a similar set of results but with lower overall scores.
18 We thank one of the referees for drawing this to our attention.
19 The inclusion of control variables in DEA analysis has been widely used in empirical studies, see, for
example, Rugggiero, 1996, 2004; Paradi and Schaffnit, 2004. Wang and Schmidt (2002), however, are
critical of this two-step procedure in DEA.
20 DEA provides scores relative to peers with similar operating characteristics based on an estimated
efficiency frontier. The resulting scores are relative not absolute scores. Therefore, a score of 100 per cent
does not imply absolute efficiency but merely efficiency compared to the other units in the analysis.
Similarly, SFA creates a frontier based on actual performances in the data set.
21 For example, in the concession involving Maynilad in Manila, the company terminated the concession
when it was refused a rate adjustment to which it considered it was entitled. By contrast, in Dolphin Bay,
South Africa, the municipality felt that it had little alternative but to agree an unplanned price rise when the
private sector supplier threatened to withdraw services (Bayliss, 2002, p.16).
22 The detailed results can be obtained from the authors. A Tobit model was used to assess the impact of the
regulation variables on the DEA scores discussed earlier. The results were also statistically insignificant.
23 Kirkpatrick and Parker (2005) discuss the implications of liberalisation of water services under the WTO
GATS for domestic regulation of water utilities.
